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1 Introduction
As it is well known, last years have witnessed a growing international-
ization of economic activities. This has resulted in a spectacular expansion
in world trade gures, which has been accompanied more recently by the
increasing role played by integration agreements among countries. As a
consequence, attention to trade eects has been a central issue among trade
policy modelers. In this way, dierent types of empirical models (e. g.,
partial and general equilibrium models, or endogenous trade policy models)
have been developed to test for trade theories, as well as for the analysis of
real and potential policies [see Baldwin and Venables (1995) for a review].
However, the huge diculties involved with building multi-country mod-
els frequently forces to design single-country models with a simplied spec-
ication for the rest of the world. Although this simplication could bias
the results, there can be good reasons (such as data availability, analytical
complexity, and so on) for using single-country models.
In theoretical trade models, two assumptions are key for the results ob-
tained: the presence of increasing returns, and country size. The sensitivity
of the results to the rst assumption has been studied empirically, among
others, by Harris (1984), Nguyen and Wigle (1992), and Harrison, Ruther-
ford and Tarr (1997), where comparisons of the eects of some liberalizing
trade policies are made in alternative general equilibrium scenarios of con-
stant versus increasing returns to scale.
But within the empirical analysis of trade policies in single-country mod-
els, discussing the large versus small country specication has not received
much attention. And the same can be said about the combined analysis
of both assumptions, returns to scale and country size. Our aim in this
paper will be to analyze the extent of the bias that these two assumptions
can introduce in trade policy simulations related with economic integration
agreements.
The article presents an extension of the Arrow-Debreu model, through an
applied general equilibrium model computed for the Spanish economy [see
Shoven and Whalley (1992) for a survey of this kind of models]. As noted by
Scarf and Shoven (1984), general equilibrium models trace the consequences
of changes in a particular variable throughout the entire economy modeled.
So, this type of framework provides a more complete analysis, as compared
to partial equilibrium models.
The reference in our empirical analysis will be the Spanish economy,
which may be relevant for three main reasons. First, Spain joined the now
European Union (EU) in 1986, which was accompanied with the imple-
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mentation of the Single Market Program, and followed by the adoption of a
common currency, the Euro, currently under way. In short, a continued pro-
cess of integration, at dierent stages, with other relatively more advanced
countries.
Second, the relevant data for testing the two main assumptions men-
tioned above (i. e., increasing returns to scale and country size) are available
for the Spanish economy, and computed indeed using recent data; the latter
is important since this kind of models are often accused of using outdated
data. In particular, we will make use of disaggregated concentration indexes
for all sectors of the economy (i. e., including services), and econometric es-
timates of export demand elasticities for manufactures.
Finally, regarding size, the existence of sectoral export demand functions
could lead to assume that Spain was a large economy in some sectors. The
size of its GDP, exports, imports, and other macroeconomic variables could
also support this assumption. In sum, the Spanish experience could be of
interest for other medium-size economies expected to undertake a process
of integration with other relatively more advanced countries.
The article is organized as follows. Our general equilibrium model is
developed in section 2. The assumptions underlying the empirical analysis,
together with the simulation results, are presented in section 3. Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
The model of this paper [based on Gomez (1998)] is static, and describes
a single country, disaggregated in eleven production sectors, with eleven
consumption goods, a single representative consumer, and a public sector.
As a general rule, the notation is as follows: endogenous variables are
denoted by capital letters, exogenous variables by capital letters with a
bar, and parameters by small Latin and Greek letters. There are n (i; j =
1; : : : ; n) production sectors. The goods produced by these n sectors are
transformed into m− 1 (k = 1; : : : ; m− 2; m) consumption goods, of which
good m is public nal consumption; whereas good m − 1 is residents’ con-
sumption abroad.
2.1 Production
Eective production Xi in each sector i (i = 1; : : : ; n) is obtained from
a composite of primary factors (V Ai) and n composites of intermediate
inputs (II1i; : : : ; IIni), according to a xed-coecients technology. Primary
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factors V Ai are CES aggregates of labor (Li) and capital (Ki), and each
intermediate input IIji is also a CES aggregate whose inputs come from both
domestic (IIDji) and foreign sources (IIFjir). This two-level technology is
described by:
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where c0i; : : : ; cni; ai; bji0; and bjir are share parameters; i and ji are
scale parameters; LKi are the elasticities of substitution between labor and
capital; and Ai are Armington elasticities of substitution, so that goods
are dierentiated by their country or region of production [see Armington
(1969)]. In our model, two regions are considered: the European Union
(EU) and the rest of the world (ROW ).
Cost functions for each input are derived from production cost mini-
mization subject to the above technology. From these cost functions, and
using Shepard’s Lemma, we obtain the demands for labor, capital, domestic
intermediate inputs, and foreign intermediate inputs:
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where PV Ai; PIIji; PIIDji; and PIIFjir are the average costs for aggre-
gate value added, aggregate intermediate inputs, and domestic and foreign
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intermediate inputs, respectively; W and R are the wage and capital rental
rates, respectively; and sswi and ssei are the ad valorem social security
contributions paid by workers and employers, respectively.
Data availability compels us to transform eective production (Xi) into
distributed production (DISTi) through the calibrated xed coecients qij
[see Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985)]:0BBB@
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The next step is to build an Armington aggregate (Ai) with production
from domestic producers (DISTi), and imports (IMPi); this means that
domestic producers are the only importers, and choose the optimal mix of
domestic and imported goods which minimize their costs. This aggregate
embodies total supply, i. e., production goods from domestic producers, and
imports:
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where ei0 and eir are share parameters.
From the left-hand side of Figure 1, we can see that, in order to get
this Armington aggregate Ai, producers demand all the inputs needed to
elaborate DISTi, as well as imports; therefore, the derived demands to get
Ai are Li; Ki; IIDji; IIFjiEU ; IIFjiROW (shown above), but also IMPiEU
and IMPiROW . Both of them can be derived from (9) in the same way than
equations (4) to (7):
IMPir = (PAi)
Ai
e
Ai
ir
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Ai
ir
Ai ; i = 1; : : : ; n; r = EU;ROW (10)
where:
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PIMPir = PMIMPiFC(1 + tari)(1 + vatii) ; i = 1; : : : ; n; r = EU; ROW (12)
being PAi the average cost of Ai, PDISTi the average cost of distributed
production net of taxes, and PIMPir the average cost of imports, including
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taris and value added taxes. As can be seen from equations (11) and
(12), some ad valorem taxes are included: tpi are net indirect taxes on
production, vatdi are value added taxes on distributed production, vatii are
value added taxes on imports, and tari are net taris. We also embody
the small open economy assumption for imports, so that PMIMPi are the
(exogenous) world prices of imports, and FC is a foreign exchange factor
between foreign and domestic units.
As shown in the right-hand side of Figure 1, producers dierentiate this
aggregate supply Ai into three types of commodities: those produced for
the domestic market (Oi), and exports directed to the EU (EXPiEU) and
the ROW (EXPiROW). These commodities are imperfect substitutes with
an elasticity of transformation i, as shown by the CET function:
Ai = i
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where di0 and dir are share parameters, and i are scale parameters. And
sales to the domestic market Oi include nal consumption (CFi), interme-
diate consumption (IIPij), and investment (Ii):
Oi = CFi +
nX
j=1
IIPij + Ii ; i = 1; : : : ; n (14)
To end this subsection, we transform nal consumption from production
goods (CFi; i = 1; : : : ; n) into consumption goods (QPk; k = 1; : : : ; m−2; m)
through the calibrated xed coecients oki, following again Ballard, Shoven
and Whalley (1985); notice that good m−1 is not included since it represents
consumption by national tourists abroad:
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2.2 Consumption
Private consumers are assumed to share homothetic and identical prefer-
ences, so that they can be represented as a single representative consumer.
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This representative consumer maximizes a two-level Cobb-Douglas utility
function (U) subject to a budget constraint. The rst level shows the deci-
sions between aggregate nal consumption (Q0) and savings or future con-
sumption (Qs) (since savings are taken in this static context as future con-
sumption, which implies myopic expectations); and the second level shows
how the consumer allocates her non-saved budget among several kinds of
consumption goods (QCk, for k = 1; : : : ; m− 1):
U = Q00 Q
s
s (16)
Q0 =
m−1Y
k=1
QCkk (17)
where 0; s; and k are share parameters.
The budget constraint is given by:
Y H = WLH(1− u) +RKH +NTPSH + NTFSHFC − IT (18)
so that the consumer’s income (Y H) comes from the labor endowment (LH),
which is aected by the unemployment rate (u); the capital endowment
(KH); net transfers from the public sector (NTPSH); net transfers from
the foreign sector, coming from both EU and ROW (NTFSH); and all this
net of an exogenous income tax (IT ).
Utility maximization subject to the budget constraint gives the nal
demand functions:
Qs =
sY
H
Ps
(19)
QCk =
k(Y H − PsQs)
Pk
; k = 1; : : : ; m− 1 (20)
where Ps and Pk are the prices of savings and the nal goods, respectively.
2.3 Public sector
Public consumption demand of good m (QCm) is derived from the max-
imization of a utility function dened over this consumption, subject to a
budget constraint. Public sector’s total income (Y G) comes from the capital
endowment (KG), plus ad valorem taxes (SSEi; SSWi; V ATi; TPi; TARi),
plus income tax (IT ), less exogenous net transfers to the representative
consumer (NTPSH), plus exogenous net transfers from the foreign sector
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(NTFSG). This income is devoted to consumption (CPUB) and to exoge-
nous savings (SAVPUB):
Y G = RKG +
nX
i=1
SSEi +
nX
i=1
SSWi +
nX
i=1
V ATi +
nX
i=1
TPi +
+
nX
i=1
TARi + IT −NTPSH + NTFSGFC (21)
SSEi = sseiWLi(1− u) ; i = 1; : : : ; n (22)
SSWi = sswiWLi(1− u) ; i = 1; : : : ; n (23)
V ATi = PMIMPiFCIMPi(1 + tari)vatii +
+PDISTiDISTi(1 + tpi)vatdi ; i = 1; : : : ; n (24)
TPi = PDISTiDISTitpi ; i = 1; : : : ; n (25)
TARi = PMIMPiFCIMPitari ; i = 1; : : : ; n (26)
CPUB = Y G − SAV PUB (27)
2.4 Foreign sector
The foreign sector in our model consists of two regions: EU and ROW .
It is assumed that our country faces a perfectly elastic export demand func-
tion for goods sold to ROW , but has some market power for certain goods
sold to EU . In these cases (sectors 3, 4, and 5; see below) we have used
constant-elasticity demand functions such as:
DEXPiEU = F (PEXPiEU) ; i = 3; 4; 5
where DEXPiEU are EU demands for Spanish goods, as a function F of
their prices PEXPiEU .
On the other hand, import supply functions are assumed to be perfectly
elastic, so that prices of goods bought to both EU and ROW are taken as
given.
2.5 Increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition
There are many well-known ways of modelling competition among rms
in applied general equilibrium models, following several alternative assump-
tions [see Francois and Roland-Holst (1997)]. However, a trade-o between
theoretical complexity and empirical data availability is always present, since
the lack of data usually prevents implementing many imperfect competition
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specications, or forces using inadequate data (aggregated gures, old data,
data belonging to another country, . . . ), which has been a common critique
to deterministic applied general equilibrium models. For these reasons, we
have chosen to represent competition among rms in our model in the fol-
lowing way.
The constant returns to scale version of the model is characterized by
a competitive pricing rule (see subsection 2.1). We will present now an al-
ternative version embodying a non-competitive pricing rule and increasing
returns to scale, due to the existence of some xed labor and capital require-
ments. The presence of xed costs means that average costs are higher than
marginal costs, so that rms set prices by charging a markup on marginal
costs. This pricing rule is based on the idea that rms face demand func-
tions with a negative slope and compete a la Cournot. There is free entry
and exit of rms in each sector, so that in equilibrium rms just break even.
In this new version of the model, the derived demands for labor and
capital (4) and (5) are replaced by:
Li = 
LKi −1
i (PV Ai)
LKi
a
LKi
i
(1 + sswi + ssei)
LK
i −1W LKi
c0iXi +
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i (PV Ai)
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R
LK
i
c0iXi +EiKFi ; i = 1; : : : ; n (29)
which include xed factor requirements of labor (LFi) and capital (KFi) for
the Ei existing rms. Also, the non-competitive pricing rule, obtained from
the rst-order condition for prot maximization should be added:
MARKUPi =
Ωi
Eidi
; i = 1; : : : ; n (30)
This equation denes the price-cost margin (MARKUPi), or Lerner
index in sector i, which depends on: the conjectural variations parameter
(Ωi; in our case: Ωi = 1, since rms compete a la Cournot); the share of the
typical rm in sector i’s output, which, under the assumption of symmetrical
rms, equals the inverse of the number of rms in each sector (1=Ei), and can
be proxied by the Herndahl index; and the perceived elasticity of demand
faced by sector i (di ).
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2.6 Equilibrium conditions
2.6.1 Goods markets
Beginning with nal goods, for goods k (k = 1; : : : ; m−2) supply (QPk)
equals consumption by the representative agent within the country (QCk)
plus consumption by foreign tourists (FCNRk). In its turn, for the good
m − 1, foreign supply (QPm−1) equals consumption by the representative
agent abroad (QCm−1), and for the good m, supply (QPm) equals public
consumption (QCm):
QPk = QCk + FCNRk ; k = 1; : : : ; m− 2 (31)
QPm−1 = QCm−1 (32)
QPm = QCm (33)
Next, for intermediate goods, supply also equals demand:
IIPij = IIij ; i; j = 1; : : : ; n (34)
and for investment (see below):
Ii = DIi ; i = 1; : : : ; n (35)
where Ii and DIi are the supply and demand of gross capital formation,
respectively.
Regarding imports and exports, we have assumed in most cases perfectly
elastic export demands and import supplies. However, in those manufactur-
ing sectors in which our reference country is assumed to have some market
power, the equilibrium condition would be:
EXPiEU = DEXPiEU ; i = 3; 4; 5 (36)
2.6.2 Factor markets
Homogenous labor and capital are the only primary factors. Demand
equations for both factors are shown in equations (4) and (5) for the constant
returns to scale version of the model, and in equations (28) and (29) for the
alternative version embodying increasing returns to scale.
The representative consumer owns the xed labor endowment (LH). We
assume wage rigidity:
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WREAL WREALmin (37)
so that the real wage (WREAL) would be above a minimum requested
(WREALmin), which allows for the presence of classical unemployment.
Labor is internationally immobile, and perfectly mobile across domestic sec-
tors. Equilibrium in the labor market is given by:
LH(1− u) =
nX
i=1
Li (38)
The representative consumer and the public sector own their xed en-
dowments of capital (KH and KG, respectively). Unlike labor, capital re-
turns are assumed to adjust to clear the market, so that is fully employed.
Capital is also internationally immobile but mobile across domestic sectors,
and equilibrium is given by:
KH + KG =
nX
i=1
Ki (39)
2.6.3 Public sector
From the public sector’s utility function we have assumed that public
consumption is determined endogenously by the public sector (CPUB =
PmQCm). Since public investment (INV PUB) and the public surplus (or
decit) (BALPUB) are both taken as exogenous, it follows that public
savings (SAV PUB) are also exogenous. Public sector closure is given by
equation (27) and:
BALPUB = SAV PUB − INV PUB (40)
2.6.4 Investment and Savings
Investment should aect productive capacity in the following periods, so
that a dynamic framework should be more appropriate. Since this is not
the objective of this paper, in our static framework investment shows its
influence on the economy as a component of nal demand.
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As we have seen, the public sector saves and invests, the representative
consumer saves, and gross capital formation is the economy’s investment.
Given domestic savings (SAVNAT ) and total investment (TOTINV ), the
macro balance is given by:
SAV NAT − TOTINV = NLBFC (41)
where NLB is the economy’s net lending/borrowing.
Following Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1981), total investment is dis-
tributed among sectors according to the calibrated xed coecients  i in
the following way:
POiDIi =  iTOTINV ; i = 1; : : : ; n (42)
where DIi is the sectoral gross capital formation demanded at average cost
POi.
2.6.5 Foreign sector
Foreign sector closure [see de Melo and Tarr (1992)] is given by:
X
r=EU;ROW
nX
i=1
PEXPirEXPir +
Pm−2
k=1 PkFCNRk
FC
+NTFSH + NTFSG −
−
X
r=EU;ROW
nX
i=1
PMIMPiIMPir − PMm−1QCm−1 = NLB (43)
where PMm−1 is the world price of good m − 1. This equation shows that
the dierence between receipts (from exports of goods, consumption of for-
eign tourists, and net transfers from abroad) and payments (from imports
of goods, and consumption by the representative agent abroad) is the econ-
omy’s net lending/borrowing.
2.6.6 Zero prots
Zero-prot conditions in domestic sectors hold in both versions of the
model, i. e., the competitive and constant returns to scale version, and the
non competitive and increasing returns to scale version. Market prices just
cover costs, that is:
PAiAi = POiOi +
X
r=EU;ROW
PEXPirEXPir ; i = 1; : : : ; n (44)
12
where POi and PEXPir are the unit prices of domestic production sold in
the domestic market and abroad, respectively.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Scenarios and data
In this section we will analyze to which extent the assumptions on returns
to scale and country size might bias the results obtained from trade policy
models, when evaluating a process of economic integration for a medium-
size economy. To this purpose, the model developed in the previous section
was calibrated and simulated using Spanish data. Our main data set is the
most recent Spanish Social Accounting Matrix, elaborated by Uriel, Beneito,
Ferri and Molto (1997) from the Spanish National Accounts, and reshaped
to t our model as explained in Gomez (1998). Elasticities are taken from
econometric evidence: elasticities of substitution between labor and capital,
and Armington elasticities come from SALTER (1991), whereas elasticities
of transformation come from de Melo and Tarr (1992). The Herndahl in-
dices, computed with recent Spanish data for all economic sectors, including
services, are taken from Bajo and Salas (1998). Finally, regarding export
demand elasticities, we have made use of Collado’s (1992) estimates within
a highly disaggregated macroeconometric model for the Spanish economy,
after aggregating them into 3 sectors (Non-energy minerals and chemicals,
Metal and machinery, Other manufacturing) using export flows as weights.
Notice that, once a single-country model with a simple rest of the world
representation has been adopted, modelers have to determine the role of
the country as trader. Two cases can be considered. First, a small open
economy (SOE) acting as a price-taker, which would explain trade based on
comparative advantage, but not cross-hauling trade; an exception would be
to incorporate an Armington (1969) specication, where goods are dier-
entiated by country or region of origin, so that intra-industry trade could
take place. Second, a large open economy (LOE) with the country acting as
a price-setter, which can be implemented, for instance, by including export
demand functions.
Incorporating the Armington assumption is common in applied general
equilibrium modelling, but this could be misleading since in some cases
countries might enjoy some additional market power and set prices in world
markets. Modelers may check if the country is a price-setter by estimating
export demand functions and testing price elasticities. So, regarding the
Spanish case, Moreno (1997) found evidence on the signicance of price
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elasticities in sectoral export demand equations.
The other assumption we want to test is the extent of competition among
rms. As stated in the previous section, the model is presented in two ver-
sions: a rst one where rms set prices in a competitive way and technology
exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS), and a second one with a non-
competitive pricing rule under a technology of increasing returns to scale
(IRS).
On the other hand, the increase in rm concentration and the fall in
price-cost margins have been reported as some ex-post eects of the SMP.
So, for instance, Allen, Gasiorek and Smith (1998) estimated an average
decrease of 3.9% in the margins of some sensible sectors, as well as a decrease
of 3.6% in the whole manufacturing sector, in a study for the four biggest
EU countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy), although
the dierences among them make this decrease to range between 1.4% for
Germany and 9.4% for France. We have embodied this pro-competitive
eect of integration as an extension of the non-competitive version of the
model so that, considering the most sensible case, simulations in some non-
competitive scenarios include an exogenous decrease of 10% in the markups
of manufacturing sectors.
Therefore, the following scenarios will be simulated:
1. Scenario SOE-CRS. All tradable goods are Armington-dierentia-
ted in a small open economy framework. Firms follow a marginal cost
pricing rule, and technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
2. Scenario SOE-IRS. All tradable goods are Armington-dierentiated
in a small open economy framework. Firms set prices as a markup on
marginal costs, and technology exhibits increasing returns to scale.
3. Scenario SOE-IRS-M. All tradable goods are Armington-dieren-
tiated in a small open economy framework. Firms set prices as a
markup on marginal costs, and this markup drops exogenously 10%
in manufacturing sectors.
4. Scenario LOE-CRS. All tradable goods are Armington-dierentia-
ted, but manufacturing sectors face export demand functions with a
nite elasticity. Firms follow a marginal cost pricing rule, and tech-
nology exhibits constant returns to scale.
5. Scenario LOE-IRS. All tradable goods are Armington-dierentia-
ted, but manufacturing sectors face export demand functions with a
14
nite elasticity. Firms set prices as a markup on marginal costs, and
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale.
6. Scenario LOE-IRS-M. All tradable goods are Armington-dieren-
tiated, but manufacturing sectors face export demand functions with
a nite elasticity. Firms set prices as a markup on marginal costs, and
this markup drops exogenously 10% in manufacturing sectors.
Some simulations have been carried out in these scenarios, representing
several aspects of the process of integration of the Spanish economy into the
EU, in particular the ex-post eects of the Single Market Program (SMP),
as well as the eects of adopting a single currency. The SMP was launched
as a set of directives to be adopted for the EU members in order to ease
movements of both goods and productive factors. Although the complete
legislative ratication had to nish on 1st January 1993, in November 1999
12.6% of EU directives had not been yet endorsed in the whole EU member
countries; however, both the EU Commission and some researchers have
produced empirical results measuring ex-post SMP eects. Although it is
clear that is not possible to measure all the likely eects, we have selected
a set of facts widely representative of the potential changes associated with
integration. Recall that we are not trying to quantify exactly the eects
of integration on the Spanish economy, but rather to show whether some
relevant assumptions (usually embodied in economic integration analysis)
might bias the results obtained from trade policy-oriented models.
The set of eects incorporated into the simulations include:
 Removal of trade barriers, including:
{ Removal of tari barriers. Spain joined the then European Com-
munity in 1986, which meant the full elimination of taris on
the other member countries’ imports. Since in our reference year
some taris remained, all taris and subsidies on EU imports
were set to zero.
{ Decrease in transport costs. The SMP directives changed custom
formalities (new value added tax system, removal of a number
of forms, and so on). The savings for the whole EU have been
estimated in 5223 million ECUs, which represents 0.66% of intra-
EU trade [see Price Waterhouse (1997, pp. 89-94)]. Hence, costs
related to both Spanish imports from the EU, and exports to the
EU, were reduced by 0.66%.
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{ Harmonization of technical barriers. National regulations on so-
me aspects such as health, security, environment, and so on, mean
traditional trade barriers. The SMP implied the adoption of some
common standards for mutual recognition, so that the process
of harmonization involved a greater similarity among EU goods.
This change was included, following Harrison, Rutherford and
Tarr (1996), through an increase in the elasticities of substitution
and transformation among goods from or to EU countries, so that
benchmark elasticities were doubled.
 Reduction in transaction costs. Collado, Sanchez and Alonso
(1999) surveyed the costs experienced by rms from managing multi-
ple currencies, and quantied the sectoral reductions in their demand
for banking and insurance inputs following the adoption of a common
currency. These sectoral reductions have been aggregated in order to
t our sectoral classication, and then applied in the simulations for
every sector.
3.2 Simulation results
The results from all the above simulations appear in tables 1 through
5, for our six scenarios. Together with the removal of trade barriers and
reduction in transaction costs, we also present the results from simulating
both eects simultaneously, termed as total eect1. Table 1 shows the ef-
fects on the main aggregate variables: GDP, employment, prices (proxied
by the consumption price index), wage and capital rental rates, exports,
imports, trade decit, and the ratios exports-GDP and imports-GDP. In
its turn, tables 2 to 5 show the eects on some selected variables (employ-
ment, exports, imports, and nal consumption, respectively), disaggregated
according to the sectors included in our model.
Beginning with the eects on aggregate variables in Table 1, we can
state a rst clear conclusion: among the dierent assumptions analyzed in
this paper, that of small versus large open economy would be the most
relevant. Although there are some dierences in the results for each of the
six scenarios, there appears a common pattern in the three SOE scenarios,
on the one hand, and in the three LOE scenarios, on the other.
1It should be noticed that, since the model of this paper is an extension of the Arrow-
Debreu framework, aggregating the individual eects does not have to be equal to the
total eect.
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In general, SOE scenarios show a higher GDP; a small job creation (un-
like LOE scenarios, where employment would show a slight decrease); a
higher decrease in prices, and wage and capital rental rates; and a strong
increase in both exports and imports, together with an almost unchanged
trade decit. On the other hand, as expected, the removal of trade bar-
riers would drive the eects on trade variables, whereas the reduction in
the demand for nancial services would have stronger eects on the rest of
variables.
A second conclusion would be the remarkable similarity of the results
between the CRS and IRS scenarios. This result would agree with that in
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1997), who justied it on their use of lower
markups than in previous studies, which came mainly from 50’s and 60’s
data. Our markups are calculated with recent Spanish data, and are also
smaller than those older estimates.
Scenarios including an additional decrease in markups in manufacturing
sectors (denoted as IRS-M) could provide us with some information about
the eects when a non-competitive framework approaches to the competitive
one. The results are in general closer to those in the IRS scenarios rather
than to the CRS scenarios, although they are similar in both absolute and
relative terms. Even so, it is worth noting that aggregate GDP and employ-
ment show a more favorable evolution, so we might infer that a competition
policy addressed to limit market power might be benecial in terms of these
macro variables.
A third conclusion would be that the trade variables are the most sensible
to the dierent scenarios assumed, a result in line with that in de Melo
and Tarr (1992). As these authors point out, the closure equation for the
foreign sector prevents, for example, a strong increase in exports without
any change in imports, which would be unrealistic since it would imply a
permanent capital outflow to the rest of the world. This problem is avoided
in the model by xing an exogenous net lending/borrowing.
As shown in Table 1, aggregate exports would increase more than aggre-
gate imports, with a similar dierence between export and import growth
rates in SOE and LOE scenarios of around 5 and 1.8 percentage points,
respectively. On the other hand, the removal of trade barriers would tend
to raise trade growth in SOE scenarios; whereas assuming an elastic export
demand function would tend to reduce exports growth, with imports growth
also falling due to the closure equation.
Turning now to the sectoral results, and beginning with the eects on
employment in Table 2, Finance and insurance shows a strong decrease due
to the reduction in sectoral demands for banking and insurance services
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following the implementation of the single currency. Other unfavorable re-
sults in terms of employment would appear, following a reduction in trade
barriers, for Metal and machinery, and Other services, which in the latter
case might be explained by the fall in public revenues (from indirect taxes
and taris), leading to a contraction in public spending and a smaller labor
demand by the public sector.
The results for sectoral trade in tables 3 and 4 conrm that the most
important changes between SOE and LOE scenarios occur in manufacturing
sectors, i. e., those modelled using elastic export demand functions. These
sectors accounted in our base year for 71% of total exports and 76% of total
imports. So, for instance, Metal and machinery exports would increase by
roughly 28% in SOE scenarios and fall by 0:6% in LOE scenarios; with
imports increasing by 22% and 6% in SOE and LOE scenarios, respectively.
Notice that there would be no symmetry in the sectoral behavior of export
and import growth rates, so that changes in sectoral trade balances would
appear, even though the foreign sector closure equation prevents that huge
overall trade imbalances arise. In general, exports and imports would be
more sensible to the removal of trade barriers, rather than to a reduction in
transaction costs.
To conclude, we present in Table 5 the eects on sectoral nal consump-
tion, in order to check whether the dierent scenarios simulated aect not
only those variables directly related with production, but also consumption
patterns. Again, the assumption of SOE versus LOE would seem to be more
relevant than that of CRS versus IRS for the results, with stronger eects
following a reduction in transaction costs than a removal of trade barriers.
4 Concluding remarks
Empirical research on trade policy is based on a set of assumptions,
which might be key for the results obtained. Two of these assumptions are
returns to scale and country size. But, even though the relevance of the
former has been extensively examined in the literature, the latter has not
hardly addressed, and the same can be said about the combined analysis of
both assumptions.
In this paper we have tried to analyze the extent of the bias that these
two assumptions can introduce in trade policy simulations related with eco-
nomic integration agreements. To this end, we used a computable general
equilibrium model, where several changes related to a process of integration
(i. e., the removal of trade barriers -taris, transport costs, and harmoniza-
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tion of technical barriers- and reduction in transaction costs following the
adoption of a common currency), were simulated in six dierent scenarios,
combining constant and increasing returns to scale, price-taking behavior
and market power for manufacturing exports, as well as an exogenous de-
crease of 10% in the markups of manufacturing sectors in non-competitive
scenarios. We focused on the Spanish case, a medium-size economy experi-
encing a process of integration with other relatively more advanced countries
in a short period of time.
We concluded that the country size assumption really matters and would
play a key role in simulation results. So, the overall eects on the main
economic variables would be magnied in small open economy scenarios
as compared to the large open economy scenarios; this result would hold
for both aggregate and sectoral variables, and would be very signicant for
trade variables. On the other hand, the results in constant returns to scale
scenarios would dier only slightly from those found in the case of increasing
returns to scale.
Finally, we would like to point out that empirical trade policy modelers
should be careful when choosing assumptions for empirical single-country
models. In particular, in the case of medium-size economies, the often
neglected country-size assumption might be more relevant for the results
obtained than the more frequently analyzed assumption of returns to scale.
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Figure 1: Production nesting in sector i
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Table 1: Simulation results: Eects on aggregate variables (% change from
base year)
Table 1A. Total eect
Variable SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
GDP 1.12 1.20 1.30 0.30 0.54 0.63
Employment 0.54 0.61 0.73 -0.76 -0.23 -0.12
Prices -2.25 -2.35 -2.48 -1.56 -1.35 -1.46
Wage rate -1.67 -1.74 -1.84 -1.15 -0.99 -1.07
Capital rental rate -0.89 -0.94 -1.02 -0.62 -0.36 -0.43
Exports 15.03 15.17 15.49 2.10 2.04 2.00
Imports 10.18 10.26 10.47 0.24 0.20 0.13
Trade decit -0.10 -0.13 -0.17 -3.70 -3.69 -3.82
Exports/GDP 13.77 13.80 14.01 1.08 1.49 1.36
Imports/GDP 8.97 8.96 9.05 -0.06 -0.34 -0.49
Table 1B. Removal of trade barriers
Variable SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
GDP -0.16 -0.12 -0.03 -0.62 -0.66 -0.58
Employment -0.47 -0.41 -0.29 -0.93 -1.10 -1.00
Prices -0.39 -0.43 -0.56 0.47 0.43 0.33
Wage rate -0.26 -0.30 -0.40 0.38 0.35 0.27
Capital rental rate -0.01 -0.06 -0.14 1.01 1.00 0.36
Exports 13.32 13.41 13.71 2.38 2.29 2.25
Imports 9.13 9.19 9.39 0.71 0.64 0.57
Trade decit 0.26 0.25 0.21 -2.83 -2.86 -2.98
Exports/GDP 13.51 13.55 13.75 3.02 2.98 2.85
Imports/GDP 9.32 9.33 9.42 1.33 1.31 1.17
Table 1C. Reduction in transaction costs
Variable SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
GDP 1.19 1.23 1.32 0.73 1.10 1.16
Employment 0.87 0.88 0.99 0.06 0.69 0.77
Prices -1.80 -1.85 -1.97 -1.83 -1.60 -1.68
Wage rate -1.35 -1.39 -1.48 -1.38 -1.20 -1.27
Capital rental rate -0.81 -0.80 -0.88 -1.00 -0.67 -0.73
Exports 1.48 1.52 1.80 -0.29 -0.28 -0.30
Imports 0.90 0.91 1.10 -0.67 -0.65 -0.74
Trade decit -0.35 -0.36 -0.39 -1.48 -1.44 -1.67
Exports/GDP 0.29 0.28 0.47 -1.01 -1.36 -1.45
Imports/GDP -0.30 -0.32 -0.22 -1.39 -1.73 -1.88
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Table 2: Simulation results: Eects on sectoral employment (% change from
base year)
Table 2A. Total eect
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Agriculture 2.08 1.83 1.58 4.01 3.79 3.63
Energy and water -0.09 0.25 -0.12 1.65 1.47 1.10
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 3.46 3.19 4.45 2.45 2.30 3.23
Metal and machinery 2.17 2.87 3.33 -1.34 -0.84 -0.36
Other manufacturing 2.30 2.24 2.34 1.92 1.85 2.00
Construction 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.63 0.69 0.68
Commerce and hotel trade 2.00 2.01 2.04 1.73 1.62 1.64
Transport and communications 2.61 1.89 1.76 2.18 1.68 1.55
Finance and insurance -4.40 -4.13 -4.09 -4.94 -4.45 -4.42
House renting 0.96 1.01 1.04 0.60 0.59 0.60
Other services -0.63 -0.52 -0.43 -3.31 -1.76 -1.70
Table 2B. Removal of trade barriers
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Agriculture 2.20 2.01 1.77 3.60 3.61 3.45
Energy and water -0.20 -0.28 -0.64 1.33 0.73 0.38
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 1.23 0.92 2.14 0.36 0.11 1.02
Metal and machinery -3.62 -2.64 -2.22 -6.02 -5.41 -4.97
Other manufactures 0.45 0.39 0.50 -0.08 -0.09 0.06
Construction 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.01
Commerce and hotel trade 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.21 0.18 0.20
Transport and communications 1.30 0.96 0.84 1.06 0.79 0.66
Finance and insurance 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.37 0.26 0.30
House renting -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.36 -0.41 -0.40
Other services -1.54 -1.48 -1.40 -2.00 -2.51 -2.46
Table 2C. Reduction in transaction costs
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Agriculture 0.48 0.44 0.28 0.97 0.81 0.75
Energy and water 0.42 0.69 0.33 0.73 0.95 0.62
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 2.24 2.25 3.30 1.88 1.95 2.67
Metal and machinery 4.32 4.14 4.54 3.43 3.39 3.77
Other manufactures 2.07 2.06 2.20 2.02 1.97 2.13
Construction 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.57 0.66 0.65
Commerce and hotel trade 1.47 1.49 1.52 1.46 1.38 1.39
Transport and communications 1.36 0.95 0.85 1.12 0.87 0.75
Finance and insurance -4.94 -4.68 -4.64 -5.33 -4.77 -4.74
House renting 0.96 1.01 1.03 0.89 0.91 0.91
Other services 0.75 0.79 0.86 -1.34 0.53 0.55
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Table 3: Simulation results: Eects on sectoral exports (% change from base
year)
Table 3A. Total eect
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Agriculture 9.70 8.83 7.86 18.67 18.01 17.25
Energy and water 5.02 5.57 4.83 9.42 9.18 8.46
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 11.70 11.46 13.24 1.57 1.54 1.85
Metal and machinery 27.41 28.10 28.51 -0.62 -0.61 -0.60
Other manufacturing 13.54 13.38 13.44 1.90 1.87 1.92
Commerce and hotel trade 2.01 1.93 1.83 2.97 2.75 2.67
Transport and communications 2.59 2.54 2.36 3.13 3.00 2.82
Finance and insurance -5.46 -5.49 -5.58 -4.89 -4.76 -4.83
Other services -0.09 -0.09 -0.15 -1.94 -0.27 -0.32
Table 3B. Removal of trade barriers
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Agriculture 14.44 13.77 12.78 21.84 21.80 21.05
Energy and water 6.74 6.48 5.74 10.49 9.59 8.88
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 9.92 9.43 11.19 0.99 0.91 1.22
Metal and machinery 22.26 23.07 23.43 -0.74 -0.73 -0.73
Other manufacturing 12.21 12.02 12.10 1.37 1.38 1.42
Commerce and hotel trade 1.87 1.80 1.70 2.48 2.50 2.42
Transport and communications 2.25 1.98 1.81 2.73 2.38 2.20
Finance and insurance 1.85 1.77 1.67 2.58 2.44 2.38
Other services 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.61 -0.01 -0.07
Table 3C. Reduction in transaction costs
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Agriculture -1.47 -1.59 -2.06 -0.03 -0.37 -0.58
Energy and water -0.66 -0.17 -0.70 0.15 0.44 -0.00
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 1.88 2.03 3.36 0.27 0.29 0.43
Metal and machinery 3.42 3.35 3.67 -0.43 -0.44 -0.48
Other manufacturing 1.70 1.71 1.85 0.24 0.22 0.25
Commerce and hotel trade 0.54 0.55 0.50 0.85 0.64 0.63
Transport and communications 0.62 0.75 0.67 0.63 0.78 0.71
Finance and insurance -7.07 -7.03 -7.06 -7.17 -6.94 -6.94
Other services -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -2.08 -0.06 -0.09
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Table 4: Simulation results: Eects on sectoral imports (% change from
base year)
Table 4A. Total eect
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Agriculture -9.10 -8.86 -8.54 -12.31 -12.27 -12.03
Energy and water 0.69 0.72 1.32 -2.94 -2.82 -2.36
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals -0.06 0.16 0.52 -5.86 -5.65 -5.70
Metal and machinery 22.42 22.18 21.96 6.99 6.64 6.13
Other manufacturing 11.94 12.39 12.75 2.84 2.91 3.03
Commerce and hotel trade -5.97 -5.42 -4.64 -11.47 -11.38 -10.81
Transport and communications -5.93 -5.33 -3.82 -11.04 -10.45 -9.16
Finance and insurance -15.13 -14.59 -13.67 -20.34 -20.01 -19.29
Other services -8.38 -7.81 -7.00 -15.86 -14.37 -13.79
Table 4B. Removal of trade barriers
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Agriculture -12.09 -11.90 -11.60 -14.82 -14.73 -14.50
Energy and water -2.36 -2.18 -1.60 -5.32 -5.11 -4.67
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals -2.80 -2.55 -2.21 -7.66 -7.42 -7.49
Metal and machinery 23.67 23.30 23.09 10.51 10.01 9.52
Other manufactures 8.65 9.05 9.37 0.88 1.04 1.15
Commerce and hotel trade -11.60 -11.22 -10.51 -16.03 -15.95 -15.43
Transport and communications -10.14 -8.99 -7.58 -14.24 -13.18 -11.96
Finance and insurance -10.78 -10.15 -9.21 -15.25 -14.99 -14.25
Other services -13.68 -13.26 -12.52 -18.12 -18.48 -17.95
Table 4C. Reduction in transaction costs
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Agriculture 2.51 2.54 2.76 1.90 1.81 1.93
Energy and water 2.38 2.32 2.77 1.51 1.49 1.76
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 2.13 2.17 2.71 1.06 1.10 1.19
Metal and machinery -0.31 -0.27 -0.43 -2.55 -2.48 -2.92
Other manufactures 2.15 2.19 2.39 0.81 0.75 0.72
Commerce and hotel trade 3.97 4.08 4.59 2.98 2.92 3.21
Transport and communications 3.14 2.77 3.94 1.99 1.69 2.64
Finance and insurance -5.98 -6.00 -5.36 -7.20 -7.08 -6.64
Other services 3.50 3.60 4.14 0.29 2.29 2.58
26
Table 5: Simulation results: Eects on sectoral nal consumption (% change
from base year)
Table 5A. Total eect
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 2.48 2.58 2.74 1.74 1.53 1.66
Tobacco and alcoholic beverages 2.66 2.78 2.96 1.85 1.65 1.80
Clothing and footwear 2.34 2.44 2.58 1.64 1.43 1.55
Housing 1.58 1.66 1.74 1.15 0.92 0.99
Home appliances 2.62 2.73 2.90 1.71 1.51 1.65
Health services 2.30 2.40 2.58 1.53 1.33 1.47
Transport services 2.41 2.54 2.66 1.57 1.39 1.47
Recreational services 2.37 2.47 2.61 1.60 1.40 1.52
Other services 1.76 1.83 1.93 1.25 1.06 1.14
Table 5B. Removal of trade barriers
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 0.42 0.47 0.62 -0.45 -0.41 -0.29
Tobacco and alcoholic beverages 0.50 0.55 0.72 -0.44 -0.40 -0.25
Clothing and footwear 0.39 0.43 0.57 -0.45 -0.41 -0.30
Housing 0.13 0.16 0.24 -0.50 -0.46 -0.39
Home appliances 0.60 0.66 0.82 -0.40 -0.36 -0.23
Health services 0.41 0.44 0.62 -0.48 -0.45 -0.31
Transport services 0.51 0.55 0.66 -0.42 -0.41 -0.33
Recreational services 0.49 0.55 0.68 -0.39 -0.35 -0.24
Other services 0.23 0.26 0.36 -0.43 -0.38 -0.31
Table 5C. Reduction in transaction costs
Sector SOE-CRS SOE-IRS SOE-IRS-M LOE-CRS LOE-IRS LOE-IRS-M
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 1.97 2.03 2.18 2.00 1.76 1.87
Tobacco and alcoholic beverages 2.08 2.13 2.30 2.08 1.85 1.98
Clothing and footwear 1.87 1.92 2.06 1.91 1.67 1.77
Housing 1.38 1.42 1.50 1.50 1.24 1.29
Home appliances 1.93 1.98 2.15 1.91 1.68 1.79
Health services 1.82 1.87 2.04 1.82 1.60 1.71
Transport services 1.82 1.89 2.00 1.80 1.61 1.67
Recreational services 1.80 1.84 1.97 1.80 1.58 1.66
Other services 1.46 1.50 1.59 1.53 1.31 1.37
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